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Abstract 
Most case-based reasoning systems have used a 
single "best" or "most similar" case as the basis 
for a solution. For many problems, however, 
there is no single exact solution. Rather, there 
is a range of acceptable answers. We use cases 
not only as a basis for a solution, but also to 
indicate the boundaries within which a solution 
can be found. We solve problems by choosing 
some point within those boundaries. 
In this paper, I discuss this use of cases with 
illustrations from CHIRON, a system T have im-
plemented in the domain of personal income 
tax planning. 
1 Introduction 
Most case-based reasoning (CBR) systems to date have 
used a single "best" or "most similar" case as the basis 
for a solution. For many problems, however, there is 
no single exact solution. Rather, there is a range of 
acceptable answers. We use cases not only as a basis 
for a solution, but also to indicate the boundaries within 
which a solution can be found. We solve problems by 
choosing some point within those boundaries. 
For example, suppose you want to sell your house. 
Two similar houses have been sold recently in the same 
neighborhood, one for $150,000 and one for $200,000. 
You can estimate that your house will sell for between 
$150,000 and $200,000. Or suppose you want to make 
chili for dinner. You have made the recipe with one 
tablespoon of chili powder and with three, and while you 
prefer the latter, both were acceptable. You can add the 
chili powder without measuring it precisely, as long as 
you stay within these limits. 
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In this paper, I discuss this use of cases in the legal 
domain. In law, the reported cases are nearly always 
boundary cases in some respect; central cases are easy, 
so they are usually not taken to court. 
Specifically, I focus on the way in which cases indicate 
the boundaries of the possible interpretation of statutes. 
Statutes are rules that have been created formally, by 
legislation. They are published by the government and 
often by private companies as well. For example, con-
sider §1034(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, governing 
the tax treatment of income from the sale of a personal 
residence, given in Figure 1. The Internal Revenue Code 
is the most important statute for United States tax plan-
ning. It contains approximately 7000 sections. 
Detailed as the Internal Revenue Code is, it still con-
tains phrases that are not defined within the statute, for 
example, the phrase "principal residence" in § 1034. To 
qualify for the benefit of §1034, a taxpayer must show, 
among other things, that he bought and sold proper-
ties which belong to this category. These phrases are 
partially, but not completely, defined by commonsense 
knowledge about the meaning of the words used and by 
examples. 
What makes reasoning about these phrases difficult 
— and interesting is that defining them is not just 
a matter of inferring defining characteristics from a set 
of examples. Generally speaking, there is no set of es-
sential characteristics shared by all positive instances of 
the statutory predicate. Some examples are typical, and 
others are more or less similar to them along various di-
mensions. As a result, classifying a particular object as 
an instance or noninstance of one of these categories is 
not always a simple task. 
Planners using such open-textured rules need some 
way of determining whether their plans satisfy the rules. 
This issue arises throughout legal reasoning, not just in 
tax. Indeed, it is part of a general natural language 
problem. Many ordinary categories, such as "tiger" or 
"cup," are surprisingly difficult to define. This inde-
terminacy has been studied in linguistics and philoso-
phy, where it is labelled open texture [Waismann, 1965; 
Hart, 1961]. Any planning rule expressed in natural lan-
guage, such as "be careful," "never get involved in a 
land war in Asia," or "buy low, sell high," suffers from 
the same problem. 
In any domain, open-textured rules can be partially 
408 CASE BASED REASONING §1034. Rollover of gain on sale of principal residence. 
(a) Nonrecognition of gain.-If property (in this section called 
"old residence") used by the taxpayer as his principal resi-
dence is sold by him and, within a period beginning 2 years 
before the date of such sale and ending 2 years after such 
date, property (in this section called "new residence") is pur-
chased and used by the taxpayer as his principal residence, 
gain (if any) from such sale shall be recognized only to the 
extent that the taxpayer's adjusted sales price (as defined in 
subsection (b)) of the old residence exceeds the taxpayer's 
cost of purchasing the new residence. 
Figure 1: §1034(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
defined by examples. The legal domain has the advan-
tage that examples are recorded and published. Each 
court case is an example — an application of the law to 
a particular set of facts. Facts and results are recorded 
by the courts in "opinions" and published, both by the 
government and by private companies. Thousands of 
examples are readily available in any law library. 
The open-textured nature of legal rules enables them 
to cover a range of possibilities, without specifying them 
in complete detail. For example, a house can be your 
principal residence whether you've lived there for one 
year or fifty, whether it has one bedroom or a hundred, 
and so forth. 
The fact that terms like "principal residence" are un-
derspecified also means that the courts can respond to 
changing circumstances. For example, they can interpret 
"principal residence" to cover cooperatives and condo-
miniums, even if those forms of ownership did not exist 
at the time the statute was passed. Similarly, the First 
Amendment protection of freedom of speech can be ex-
tended to cover television and radio, as well as newspa-
pers. 
Because the system is flexible, it is also uncertain. In 
law, unlike domains such as chess, it is impossible to 
prove a plan correct. This uncertainty is not due to lack 
of factual information (we can assume complete knowl-
edge of the facts); but to the underspecified nature of 
the rules. 
Planners need some ability to predict how the law will 
be applied. This is supplied by the doctrine of precedent, 
which provides that, unless there is some strong reason 
to do otherwise, courts must follow their own previous 
decisions. Similar cases must be decided similarly. 
Suppose you want to take advantage of one of these 
open-textured rules. Say for example that you want to 
sell your house and obtain the benefits of § 1034(a). You 
will consider your situation in relation to past cases un-
der this provision and try to construct a plan for sell-
ing your house that is supported by previous successful 
cases. Because the courts are bound by precedent, if your 
case is similar to or stronger than past successful cases, 
it will be decided the same way. If it is weaker than past 
successful cases, you might still win, but this is an ad-
versarial domain. To avoid challenge by the government, 
you will try to stay within the boundaries indicated by 
those cases. 
At least, that is what you will do if you are a typical 
conservative tax planner. If you are a little more ag-
gressive, and the successful cases indicate a trend, you 
may go beyond them in the same direction. For exam-
ple, if you have a successful case where someone sold a 
house they only lived in for a year, you may try selling 
your house after six months. In other words, you will 
extrapolate from the cases in your casebase, rather than 
interpolating between them.1 
1 have implemented this approach in CHIRON, a system 
that constructs plans in the domain of personal income 
tax planning [Sanders, 1994]. In Section 2 of this pa-
per, I give an overview of the system; in Section 3, 1 
describe the representation it uses for rules, cases, and 
other knowledge; in Section 4, I give a brief example; 
in Section 5 I discuss related work; and in Section 6, I 
summarize the results of this paper. 
2 Overview of CHIRON 
In order to reason about open-textured rules and cases, 
CHIRON combines hierarchical and case-based planners 
in a hybrid system. The hierarchical planner (adapted 
from a version of Nonlin implemented at the University 
of Maryland [Ghosh et ai, 1991]) calls the case-based 
module for guidance in choosing rules to use in refining 
its plans and refining the open-textured predicates that 
remain when the rules run out. The case-based plan-
ner uses the hierarchical planner to help with indexing, 
controlling adaptations, and combining plans. 
Because law is an adversarial domain, it is useful to 
have a safe interpretation of the rules, what tax planners 
refer to as a "safe harbor plan." If this plan is executed, 
it will probably be safe from challenge by the govern-
ment; the more a plan differs from it, the more likely it 
is to be challenged (and to lose). Accordingly, CHIRON 
associates a prototype "safe-harbor plan" with each of 
the hierarchical planner's strategies. 
CHIRON uses cases to indicate how much a plan can 
differ from the prototype. It starts by instantiating the 
prototype and adapting it only as much as necessary to 
fit the facts of the current situation. Some adaptations 
consist simply of adding a fact to the prototype; others 
involve varying the parameters of a given fact. Any fact 
in one of the previous cases can potentially be added 
to the prototype to make a new plan. Similarly, facts 
can be subtracted from the prototype, and parameters 
can be varied, as suggested by the cases in the casebase. 
If the resulting plan is weaker than any of the previous 
successful cases along some dimension, the system rejects 
it, unless there is a trend towards weakening cases along 
that dimension.2 
The prototype, cases, and adaptations define a space 
of possible plans for satisfying a rule. In general, the 
system generates plans that fall between the prototype 
and previous successful cases of a given strategy. Within 
1 Like the other examples in this paper, this one is strictly 
hypothetical, and not to be relied upon as tax advice. 
2 For this purpose, a "trend" is defined simply as two cases, 
one decided earlier than the other, where both decided in 
favor of the taxpayer, both were weaker than the prototype 
along a given dimension, and the second was weaker than the 
first. 
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CHIRON's knowledge base includes representations of the 
Internal Revenue Code and approximately twenty-four 
cases under various provisions of that statute. It also in-
cludes safe harbor plans, or prototypes, that satisfy the 
rules; a representation of the relationship between the 
rules, prototypes, and cases; and finally, a representa-
tion of the input description of the taxpayer's goals and 
current situation. 
CHIRON has a number of tax-reduction strategies, in-
cluding, for example, selling a house and buying another 
to get the §1034 rollover, making a charitable donation, 
and selling a house and taking the §121 exclusion. These 
strategies can generally be used either individually or in 
combination. All of these strategies and all of their pos-
sible combinations are candidate plans. Each strategy 
corresponds to a leaf node in the hierarchical planner's 
plan hierarchy, a portion of which is given in Figure 2. 
The rules in the hierarchy are based on statutory pro-
visions: to reduce your taxes, you can reduce your tax-
able income or find credits; to reduce your taxable in-
come, you can attribute your income to someone else, 
exclude it, defer it to a later year, or deduct expenses; 
and so forth. Each leaf node, or strategy, corresponds 
to some open-textured portion of the rules. Associated 
with each leaf node, there is a prototype, a set of defor-
mations, or ways in which the prototype can be adapted, 
and a set of past cases in which the taxpayer attempted 
(successfully or unsuccessfully) to satisfy the given rule. 
Cases are represented using a structure that has fields 
for the name (the official legal citation), short-name (an 
abbreviated form of the citation for use in text), court, 
date, facts, strategies involved, and holdings of the case, 
as well as various indices. Information about which fea-
tures strengthen or weaken a case with regard to a par-
ticular strategy is stored separately. 
The facts of both previous cases and the current situa-
tion are represented as lists of propositions, including for 
each case a precise representation of the facts as given in 
the official reports for that case and in addition, abstrac-
tions from those facts that seem useful, based on the 
reasoning in each case, other cases, or general domain 
knowledge. Representing this knowledge required fea-
tures such as space, time, action, permission, obligation, 
knowledge, belief, and intention, as other researchers in 
this domain have noted [Cuthill and McCartney, 1993; 
McCarty, 1989b]. Particularly characteristic of United 
States income tax law are transactions: sales, gifts, 
loans, and other transfers of money or property. In ad-
dition, unpredictable idiosyncratic details occur in each 
new case, such as the fact that the kitchen in a house 
has a tile floor, or the taxpayer is a war veteran, or the 
taxpayer has two children, one of whom is ten years old. 
To represent these facts as accurately as possible, it 
is necessary to have a representation language that is 
both flexible and extensible. I chose an extension of the 
temporal logic developed by Shoham in [Shoham, 1988], 
modified to incorporate the modal operators "know," 
"believe," "want" (or "goal"), and "obligated." This 
language is influenced by McDermott's temporal logic 
and also by the work of McCarty in representing legal 
concepts, especially [McCarty, 1989b]. 
Part of the representation of one of CHlRON's cases is 
given in Figure 3; for the full representation of this case 
and the original text of the case, see [Sanders, 1994]. 
Associated with each strategy is a prototype. A pro-
totype is represented using the same structure as a case, 
but with a conservative, safe set of facts, very likely to 
satisfy the open-textured provisions setting forth that 
strategy. The prototypes' facts are derived from general 
domain knowledge, including the commonsense meaning 
of statutory phrases, treatises, and the cases themselves. 
In any law case, there are some easy questions that are 
not at issue, and these questions provide some informa-
tion about the prototypical case. The prototypes' facts 
are templates, or lists of generalized fact patterns, in-
stantiated for each situation in which CHIRON attempts 
to use them. Similarly, in a treatise or regulation, a 
lawyer would find a generalized plan, with the details of 
particular cases to be filled in by the lawyer. 
The relationship between the prototypes and cases is 
captured in the system's adaptation knowledge. As-
sociated with each predicate in CHlRON's vocabulary 
is a corn pare-function, which determines whether two 
facts with that predicate are comparable (matching, or 
one stronger than the other) with respect to a partic-
ular strategy. Some facts, where present, are known to 
strengthen or weaken the taxpayer's case. In some cases, 
there is domain knowledge concerning how a fact can be 
made stronger or weaker. Where known, this informa-
tion is also associated with the predicates. A plan can 
be adapted by changing any of its facts into a stronger 
or weaker fact or by adding or subtracting facts. 
4 Example 
CHIRON solves a cluster of problems having to do with 
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Many of the provisions of the United States Internal 
Revenue Code affect these transactions, directly or in-
directly. In addition to the general provisions governing 
sale of capital assets, payment of interest on loans, and 
so forth, there are special benefits for residential hous-
ing. For example, under certain circumstances, the gain 
from the sale of an individual's principal residence can 
be deferred or completely excluded from taxation. §§121, 
1034. 
CHIRON's examples have been chosen in part because 
they are simple; most tax planners would agree on at 
least the obvious solutions. In addition, they illus-
trate problems such as timing and satisfaction of open-
textured rules that are typical of the domain. Finally, 
since they all involve transfers of residential housing, the 
commonsense knowledge that must be formalized to han-
dle them involves the same cluster of concepts. 
Consider a straightforward example: the taxpayer, 
whose name is Greenlee, wants to sell a house. She has 
owned the house, identified by the token 32-Eleventh-
Street, since October 30, 1972, and has occupied the 
house during that entire period. She is now fifty-two 
years old. CHIRON takes as input the internal represen-
tation of these facts. 
Next, CHIRON determines that the current situation 
involves one type of transaction: a sale of real property 
in return for some other unspecified type of property. 
CHIRON then retrieves the cases in its casebase that also 
involved a sale of real property. There are four, Welch 
v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 79,010 (1979), Trisko 
v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 515 (1957), Sayre v. United 
States, 163 F.Supp. 495 (S.D.W.Va. 1972), and Hugh-
ston v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 50,188 (1950). 
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in Figure 3. 
These cases suggest three strategies: a §121 exclusion, 
which permits a taxpayer who is over 55 years old to 
sell his or her principal residence and exclude part of the 
gain from tax, if he or she meets certain tests; a rollover, 
where the taxpayer sells one principal residence and buys 
another; and a like-kind exchange, where the taxpayer 
exchanges one piece of property for another similar one. 
CHIRON now attempts to construct a plan for each of 
these strategies in the current situation, starting with 
the like-kind exchange. It rejects this strategy on the 
grounds that there is no support for the plan along the 
dimension "duration-of-occupancy." The taxpayer has 
been living in her house for many years. The properties 
involved in a like-kind exchange must be "held for pro-
ductive use in a trade or business or for investment...." 
§1031. Personal use of of the property weakens the tax-
payer's case, and there are no cases in CHIRON'S casebase 
with this weakness, so the system rejects the plan. Sim-
ilarly, it rejects the §121 exclusion, because the statute 
sets a minimum age of 55 for taking advantage of the 
provision, the taxpayer is only 52, and there is no case 
support for a lower age. 
With regard to the rollover, however, the taxpayer is 
in a strong position. Her case is no weaker, and in some 
respects stronger, than the prototype for this strategy. 
As a result, the system suggests the following plan. The 
taxpayer is advised to live in the house until the date 
of sale, sell it and buy another on the same date, and 
occupy the new house immediately. In addition, the tax-
payer should have only one residence at the time of sale. 
This is a very conservative plan, but it can be executed 
by the taxpayer, given the simple facts of our example 
(from a tax point of view, at least; the realities of the 
housing market may make selling more difficult). 
In support of the plan, the system notes its similari-
ties with the prototype. As in the prototype, Greenlee 
has bought and occupied a house, and she will (if she 
executes this plan) sell a house that she has been occu-
pying until the date of sale. In both the prototype and 
the current situation, the taxpayer has one residence at 
the time of sale. And she has been living in her house 
longer than the minimal amount of time required by the 
prototype. Finally, the system notes, the time elapsed 
between the sale of one house and purchase of another, 
if Greenlee follows the plan, will be shorter than that 
required by the prototype. 
Next, the system prints out a response for the govern-
ment. It cannot find any weaknesses in the plan (which is 
indeed quite standard), but it does find a case, Welch v. 
Commissioner, in which the taxpayer lost even though 
in some respects, the taxpayer's plan was even stronger 
than the prototype. 
In Welch, the system points out, the government won 
even though the taxpayer had occupied his first resi-
dence for seven years, longer than the prototype requires, 
bought a new piece of property only ten months and 22 
days after the sale of his old residence, and occupied the 
new property a year, eight months, and two days after 
the sale, both less than the two-year interval allowed by 
the prototype. 
Since the government has cited a new case in response, 
the taxpayer offers a rebuttal. The best rebuttal here 
would be that Welch was decided under an old version 
of the statute. In the time period covered by this case, 
the statutory time limit was eighteen months. Because 
the taxpayer's house was not completed within the time 
limit, he was unable to occupy it until two months after-
wards. The prototype case, on the other hand, is within 
the current statutory time limit. 
CHIRON has no means of reasoning about the dynamic 
nature of statutes, however, so it must look for other dis-
tinctions. In addition to some minor differences between 
the transactions involved in the two cases, the system 
notes that the current plan is stronger than Welch along 
exactly the dimensions that the government had cited in 
comparing Welch to the prototype: Greenlee has lived in 
her house longer than the taxpayer in Welch lived in his, 
and, if she executes the plan, she will buy and occupy a 
new house sooner than the taxpayer in Welch did. Thus, 
even though the system assumes all its cases are decided 
under the same version of the statute, it provides strong 
support for the right conclusion in this case. 
The system has now considered all the strategies rec-
ommended by the case-guided search mechanism and 
recommended one of them. It reminds the user which 
strategy was successful, and offers the user a chance to 
consider other possibilities. From here on, the user can 
request any strategy or combination of strategies he or 
she would like the system to consider; requests will be 
processed in a similar manner. 
5 Related Work 
Most CBR systems have used a single "best" or "most 
similar" case as the basis for a solution (see, e.g., 
[Hammond, 1986; Koton, 1988; Sycara, 1989; Kolod-
ner, 1989]). Some systems can adapt and combine 
pieces of several old cases to solve a problem (Sec, 
e.g., [Alterrnan, 1986; Branting, 1990; Redmond, 1990; 
Zito-Wolf and Alterrnan, 1992; McCartney, 1993; Ket-
tler, 1995]), but few have attempted to place the current 
situation in the context of a group of past cases. 
The CBR systems that place the current situation in 
the context of a group of past cases have done so in or-
der to reason about open-textured legal concepts. Gard-
ner's program retrieves multiple cases and uses them to 
determine whether in a given situation a contract has 
been formed [Gardner, 1987]. Both HYPO and CABARET 
also retrieve multiple cases. Their case representation 
is more detailed than Gardner's and incorporate dimen-
sions, so that cases can be compared with each other and 
with the current situation. These comparisons are used 
as a basis for generating arguments for and against the 
satisfaction of open-textured concepts, again in a given 
situation [Ashley, 1991; Rissland and Skalak, 1991]. 
Besides using multiple cases, other solutions to the 
problem of reasoning about open-textured rules have in-
cluded prototypes [Bareiss, 1988; McCarty, 1980; 1989a]; 
annotating rules with arguments for and against their 
application in borderline cases [Bench-Capon and Ser-
got, 1988; Sergot ei a/., 1986]; and the single "best 
412 CASE BASED REASONING match" from a set of cases with a rich, detailed semantic-
net representation [Branting, 1990]. 
CHIRON is the first case-based planner to reason about 
its plans in the context of a group of previous cases. 
Its solution builds on previous approaches to reasoning 
about open-textured rules, combining prototypes, cases, 
dimensions, and arguments for and against the appli-
cation of the rules. Prototypes are particularly useful 
in a planning system where, unlike legal analysis sys-
tems, the facts are not yet known. Accordingly, CHIRON 
uses prototypes and deformations, or adaptations, cor-
responding to its open-textured rules. In order to limit 
the extent to which prototypes can be adapted, it uses 
cases. Each rule corresponds to a prototype and a set of 
cases in which that rule is interpreted. The cases are re-
lated to the prototype, and to each other, by the possible 
adaptations. In addition, CHIRON compares the current 
plan to cases interpreting the same rule in order to gen-
erate arguments for and against the plan's success. The 
system's detailed representation language for the facts 
of cases supports detailed comparisons and adaptations. 
None of the previous systems combines all of these fea-
tures. 
6 Conclusions 
Most case-based reasoning systems have used a single 
"best" or "most similar" case as the basis for a solution. 
For many problems, however, there is no single exact 
solution. Rather, there is a range of acceptable answers. 
We use cases not only as a basis for a solution, but also 
to indicate the boundaries within which a solution can 
be found. We solve problems by choosing some point 
within those boundaries. Some case-based legal analysis 
systems have used the technique of placing the current 
situation within the context of a set of past cases, but it 
has not been used in a problem-solving system. 
In this paper, I discuss this use of cases with illustra-
tions from CHIRON, a system 1 have implemented in the 
domain of personal income tax planning. CHIRON uses a 
prototype, or safe harbor plan, representations of actual 
legal cases, and HYPO-like dimensions to define a space 
of possible plans and constructs plans to fit within that 
space. This solution is especially well-suited to adversar-
ial domains, where varying too far from the prototype 
may cause a plan to be challenged. The basic idea of 
planning within boundaries could also be translated into 
a domain without explicit adversaries, such as cooking. 
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